

DOCI-76-303  
5 March 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT : Review of OCI's Periodical Publications

1. I am attaching the report of the OCI group working for the past two weeks under [ ] leadership. I think that, given the time available, they have done an imaginative and fruitful job, and I support--in modified form--the option they have chosen, although not necessarily for all the same reasons that led them to that choice.

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2. I recommend the following:

a. A PDB with a circulation expanded to include the current Presidential foreign affairs "team," which I understand includes the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. We would, of course, retain the right to deliver ultrasensitive material to the President only. We would offer the PDB in a "checklist" format and style, and see whether this meets the President's current reading habits better than the format and style we are now using.

b. A NID produced in two editions: the first edition, circulated to the present list of NID customers, and to the Congress if the DCI and White House can accept that, with the current NID level of classification; the second edition would replace the present NIB. I would suggest that the name of both editions be changed to Daily National Intelligence Bulletin. Both editions would appear in a new format, which we believe would meet most of the criticisms of the present NID and yet retain the advantages and savings of the newspaper layout.

c. A new Weekly, possibly re-named The Weekly Analytical Review, containing a world regional summary

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of the past week's major developments, plus analytical articles in a separate section. A new format permits us to publish this within 16 to 20 pages, and we would offer it as the vehicle of choice for the self-initiated memoranda now produced discretely by DDI components for more than typescript dissemination. The classification would be TKH. If there were real demand for a version at a lower classification, this could be arranged at relatively small cost in time and effort.

d. WHSRs and Staff Notes as at present.

3. To better protect sources and methods, we would campaign to reduce source descriptions to a bare minimum in all publications except the PDB. If the work of your group on classification problems should prove fruitful, we might be able to go to a single edition of the DNIB.

4. Re coordination, I recommend that we adopt the rule that all publications, except the PDB, but including the Weekly, will be coordinated throughout the Agency and Community, but in substance only with the precise language left in our hands. We would, at the same time, accept formally the responsibility for ensuring that full expression is given to differing views, and would insist that, time permitting, our analysts canvass the community in advance of drafting. Any analytical article that consciously presented an idiosyncratic thesis--and there would be room for these--should be clearly labeled as such at the outset.

5. The role of DIA, State, and NSA in the production of the DNIB would be as it is with the current NID. We would accept contributions from other agencies and circulate our own drafts for comment (though not for "coordination" re language), and in general we would encourage exchange of ideas and proposals. The DNIB should indicate that it was produced "in consultation" with DIA, NSA, INR, etc. The new Weekly should be produced in the same way as the DNIB.

6. As a fall-back on coordination, [ ] believes, on the basis of our experience with the NID, that it is technically feasible to produce in the modified newspaper format with full, formal coordination as we now do for the

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NIB, except for very late-breaking items.

X1 7. I have not addressed two further issues: savings, and the proposal in the "Forbush report" for a morning journal summarizing overnight cables. Re savings, the OCI group's report speaks for itself; I am satisfied that a careful effort was made to achieve as much precision as possible on costs; [ ] agrees that these new figures are as good as we can come up with, even though they are quite different from those he developed. Re a morning journal, I do not have a ready answer. Traditionally, this has been an Operations Center kind of function; it is useful, but dangerous. With new means of communication among ops centers, perhaps a consolidated journal, including a cable summary plus the NMCC operational status report, could be put together without infringing on the analytical function or creating heartburn on high.

8. Finally, let me note some of the general advantages I see in the option I am recommending.

- A visible change in formats--not changes that will subject our major customers to culture shock, but changes that will respond to a good number of the criticisms directed at the current publications--e.g., eliminate "loaded" headlines in the Daily.
- Minimal change in actual procedures; we do not shift gears to such an extent that we would really wrench the machinery if we should have to make further and more dramatic change after January 1977.
- Consolidation of publications by eliminating a separate Congressional publication, by making the DNIB a single publication with two editions, and potentially by providing in the new Weekly an outlet for what are now separate memoranda.

It seems to me that these changes--along with the possible addition of a Director's Weekly Intelligence Report to the President and a new format for the PDB--should go a substantial distance to satisfy our present critics, the DCI's

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desire to show that he is responsive and is looking for improved ways of doing things, the requirement for "savings," and the need to put our relations with the Congress on a better footing.



William K. Parmenter  
Director of Current Intelligence

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Attachment:

"Report of OCI Periodical  
Review Task Group"

Distribution:

Orig & 1 - DDI w/atts  
1 - DOCI w/some atts  
1 - DDOCI w/some atts  
1 - C/PD w/some atts  
1 - DC/PD w/some atts

Covering Memo:

DDI/DOCI/WKParmenter:tfk

Report:

DDI/OCI/C/PD/[redacted]:dhl/ksc

cc covering memo only - D/OSR

D  
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1. The problem is to combine:
  - The DCI's desire to stay in close touch with his analysts;
  - His need to establish an ecumenical approach to national intelligence;
  - The practical necessity
    - a) to rely on CIA production
    - b) to keep lines of command and responsibility clean
  - The requirements that produce<sup>R</sup> evaluation flow into the resource mechanism.

2. One way of doing this is to decide that the "Community Deputy" should be redefined as the Deputy for Community Management, and that the IC Staff be redefined as his staff and as the secretariat for the CFI. In that case, the "Agency Deputy" takes on more general responsibilities for substantive production. He must then recognize and be tasked with certain Community responsibilities as well as Agency ones. This redefinition establishes a situation with a clear division between the two deputy<sup>ies'</sup>~~s~~ responsibilities, whereas the Community-Agency division thrusts the Community Deputy into the Agency Deputy's business.

3. If such a division were established, then it would be possible to combine a different approach to ecum<sup>9</sup>~~n~~icalism with a

greater respect for line management. At the same time, it would be possible to introduce or recover certain ~~elements~~ <sup>previous</sup> ~~factors~~ of ~~present~~ systems that have proven useful. One such was the Board of National Estimates. A ~~restructure~~ <sup>structure</sup> of this institution would have political as well as practical values. The Board, when it was in fact an elite group, acted as a spark-plug for national intelligence, and provided as well a collegial review that established quality standards. The SSC is convinced -- I think wrongly -- that in addition it protected the DCI from political pressures and was abolished for that reason. Reestablishment of the Board would help defuse the SSC and would have some plusses of its own.

4. One scheme that would to a degree meet all the requirements laid out above would be as follows:

- a. Reconstitute USIB as a National Intelligence Board advisory to the DCI, charged only with substantive matters. The DCI would be Chairman, with the Deputy for the Agency as the ~~CIA Member~~ <sup>and Vice-Chairman</sup>. The latter would also be responsible for staff support. The membership would include at least CIA, DIA, INR and Treasury.
- b. Establish a "Board of National Estimates" reporting directly to the DCI. It would be responsible for:
  - Advising him personally on substantive matters

- Reviewing National Estimates  
for him prior to their sub-  
mission to USIB
- Overseeing other aspects of  
national production and pro-  
viding the DCI with indepen-  
dent assessments of its quality
- Probing within the national  
intelligence structure to  
ensure that newly emerging  
topics are being covered  
and that new methodologies  
are being tested
- But not participating in the  
production of intelligence or  
directing the production of  
intelligence.


Such a Board might consist of <sup>6-7</sup>~~5-6~~ members,  
senior, bright, still active officers,  
serving <sup>for</sup>~~on~~ fixed terms of no more than five  
years. It would be drawn as much as possible  
from outside government, but should have one  
representative drawn from DoD, one from State,  
and one senior professional from CIA. The  
Chairman might be any of its members. Its  
staff would be limited to one professional  
officer.

5. Establish under the Deputy for the Agency a National Intelligence Tasking Committee. It would be chaired by the DDI and includes his opposite members in DIA and INR. It would be responsible for allocating production responsibilities for National Estimates and other inter-agency products, and for ensuring that they are properly reviewed throughout the chain of command of CIA and other agencies before submission to the DCI. The central mechanism for coordination and review would be CIA/DDI. The Tasking Committee would also be the body responsible for providing evaluations of collection as requested by the Deputy for the Community. This Committee would have a small non-substantive Secretariat that would also serve as Secretariat for the NIB.

6. Charge the DDI (and DDS&T), under the Tasking Committee, with producing the Agency contribution to national intelligence, and with providing support, <sup>substantive</sup> ~~especially briefings~~, to the DCI and to the Board of National <sup>Estimates</sup> ~~Intelligence~~. The responsibility would include <sup>preparation of</sup> ~~that for~~ briefing texts. Under the Tasking Committee, appropriate functional and regional officers in CIA, DIA and INR would chair informal inter-agency committees designed to reach across bureaucratic barriers and promote both collector-producer and interdisciplinary interchange.



7. In terms of wiring diagrams the organization would look as follows:




8. In terms of process, it would work as follows for a National Estimate. (Other forms of national intelligence, however, could be produced within the same general system):


- a. X asks DCI for an estimate
- b. DCI, through his Deputy for the Agency, charges the National Tasking Committee
- c. The Committee charges, say, the DDI with production of the estimate.

- d. The DDI, drawing on other agencies as necessary or desirable, drafts the estimate, coordinates it with the other agencies, and forwards it, together with tentative dissents, through the Dep/CIA to the DCI.
- e. The DCI refers the draft to the Board of Estimates. The Board reviews the draft, discussing it as necessary with the organizations responsible, and recommends 1) it be forwarded to NIB, 2) it be changed in specific and manageable ways, or 3) it be remanded. The DCI can accept or reject the Board recommendation.
- f. If the DCI forwards the draft to NIB after its consideration and if the DCI, on the basis of BNE and MIB recommendations, is satisfied, he can release the completed estimate, together with any dissents, to the requester.

9. The procedure preserves the integrity of the chain of command, and line responsibility, down to the individual analyst, for the

quality of the work. It also provides at least as much Community participation in the process as now exists. Finally, it provides the DCI with a unique independent control over quality and direct participation in the process through the BNE, without crossing command lines or tying up staff duplicative efforts. Such a BNE could be a unique asset to the DCI.





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Approved For Release 2005/07/28 : CIA-RDP91M00696R000900010005-2


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Option I

- Sets up Community Deputy as responsible for all Community matters, including production
- Incorporates NIO successor group in IC Staff
- Establishes National Foreign Intelligence Board as successor to USIB

**OPTION I**  
Deputies Divided  
Community-Agency





Option I

PRO's

- Emphasizes DCI Community role
- Provides integrated approach to program evaluation

CON's

- Defense influence on national intelligence judgments appears too strong
- National intelligence may take second place to resource issues
- Strength of two deputies far out of balance; Community deputy almost a rival to DCI
- Further downgrading of CIA
- Either IC Staff will be split, or NIO's will be physically separated from their analytic base
- Disruption of CIA chain-of-command